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Abstract 
 
The East African Community (EAC) economic integration has gained momentum 
recently, with the EAC countries aiming to adopt a single currency in 2015. This paper 
evaluates empirically the readiness of the EAC countries for monetary union. First, 
structural similarity of the EAC countries is measured in terms of similarity of production 
and exports. Second, the symmetry of shocks among the EAC members is examined with 
structural VAR. Both methods point to a low shock synchronization in the EAC, 
suggesting that the move to EAMU would need a thorough evaluation and preparation. 
The paper concludes with policies that would facilitate the EAC regional economic 
integration, including the possible eventual establishment of a monetary union. 
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I. Introduction 
 
Interest in regional integration in Africa has accelerated recently, reflecting a renewed 
political will and increased resource flows for regional projects under the Extended 
Integrated Framework and Aid-for-Trade initiatives. Integration measures in the East 
African Economic Community (EAC) regained momentum in 2005, after some 
stagnation.2 Over the years, the members have established closer economic links through 
a Free Trade Area (2001), a Customs Union (2005), and a Common Market (2010). 
These efforts have paid off: a deeper regional integration and trade within the EAC than 
in other African sub-regions have contributed to East Africa’s resilience during the global 
financial crisis (GFC) in 2009 and 2010 and to overall fast growth (Brixiova and 
Ndikumana, 2011; Guerguil et al., 2011, and Winston and Castellanos, 2011).  
 
Given the progress with intra-regional trade, the objective of the EAC countries is the 
establishment of the East African Monetary Union (EAMU), with the circulation of the 
single currency in the summer of 2015. The March 2010 Joint Meeting of the EAC 
Ministers adopted the road map for this goal, which includes milestones such the 
adoption of an Exchange Rate Mechanism (ERM), creation of the regional central bank, 
and finally the establishment of the EAMU. However, macroeconomic convergence in 
the EAC has been limited. Questions have thus emerged about the countries’ readiness to 
join the EAMU within the agreed time frame, especially in light of slow implementation 
of common market elements such as free mobility of labor, capital and goods.3  
 
This paper investigates whether the targeted speedy creation of the EAMU and the 
associated loss of the ability to conduct counter-cyclical monetary policy could be too 
costly for the EAC countries. Using the Optimal Currency Area (OCA) approach, it tests 
empirically the extent of the shock synchronization among the EAC members.4 If the 
countries in the union have major structural difference, common monetary police will 
have differential impacts that may not be helpful to some members. These differences 
may reduce the benefits of the union by increasing the volatility of business cycles.  
 
The paper is organized as follows: After this Introduction, Section II highlights the 
progress with regional integration in the EAC. In Section III the shock synchronization of 
the EAC is analyzed using the indexes of structural similarity and the structural VAR 
model. Section IV draws policy conclusions and recommendations for advancing  
regional integration in East Africa. 
 
 
                                                 
2 The EAC comprises of Kenya, Tanzania, Uganda, Rwanda and Burundi, with a combined population of 
126.6 million people and a nominal GDP of USD73 billion in 2010. 
3 Bøds (2001) concluded that most of Africa’s regional integration efforts lacked political will to be 
implemented, and the countries continued to focus on relative national gains and sovereignty. While this 
general conclusion could have been true at turn of the century, the renewed interest for deeper integration 
in East Africa this time around seems to represent serious efforts for change.  
4 The OCA analysis claims that membership of a currency union provides countries micro economic 
efficiency gains at the cost of their relinquishing independent monetary and exchange rate policy. This 
approach is highly relevant for economies with flexible exchange rates, such as the EAC countries. 
 - 2 -
II. Regional Convergence in the EAC: The Facts 
 
II.1 Convergence Criteria 
 
The OCA theory suggests the macroeconomic convergence as a precondition for forming 
a monetary union (Mundell, 1961 and others). This applies also to the EAMU. The EAC 
convergence process, measured mostly through macroeconomic criteria, has three stages: 
looser macro stance during 2007-10; tighter one during 2011-2014, and the monetary 
union from 2015 on (Table 1).  
 
Table 1: Macroeconomic Convergence Criteria in the EAC 
    <Stage 
  Indicator Stage 1: 2007 - 2010 
Stage 2: 2011 - 
2014 Stage 3: 2015 
Budget Deficit to 
GDP ratio   
     Excluding grants < 6% < 5% 
     Including grants < 3% < 2% 
     
Inflation < 5% < 5% 
     P
ri
m
ar
y 
C
ri
te
ri
a 
External reserves > 4 months import cover > 6 months imports  
     
Real exchange rate Stable   
Interest rates Market based Market based 
Real GDP growth > 7% > 7% 
Debt 
Reduced to sustainable 
levels Sustainable levels 
Savings to GDP 
ratio > 20% > 20% 
Current account 
(excluding grants) 
Consistent with debt 
sustainability 
Consistent with 
debt sustainability 
Banking 
supervision and 
regulations 
Implementation of the 25 
Core Principles   
Se
co
nd
ar
y 
C
ri
te
ri
a 
Payment and 
settlement systems 
 
Adhere to Core Principals 
for Systematically 
Important Systems   
In
tro
du
ct
io
n 
of
 si
ng
le
 c
ur
re
nc
y 
  
Source: Adapted from Opolot and Luvanda, 2009. 
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Macroeconomic convergence is crucial, but research on monetary integration suggests 
that structural similarities among monetary union members are key for the unified impact 
of their joint monetary policies. This is because the adoption of a single currency 
eliminates some of the macro policies (monetary and exchange rate policy) that countries 
can use to adjust to economic shocks.5 Instead, all countries in the monetary union are 
subject to the same monetary policy, which would be more effective under synchronized 
shocks. Even when shocks are not synchronized though, the monetary union can be 
economically advantageous if countries have mobile labor markets (Mundell, 1961), a 
high degree of economic openness (McKinnon, 1963), enabling business environment 
and diversification in production and consumption (Kenen, 1969). 
Another stream of literature, pioneered, by Frankel and Rose (1998), argues that is that 
the OCA is self-fulfilling ex post. It underscores that by reducing transactions costs and 
eliminating the exchange rate risk, a common currency promotes intra-regional trade and 
synchronizes business cycles, as countries’ economic institutions become similar. More 
recent work on the OCA (Corsetti, 2009) posits that factors supporting monetary 
integration are financial sector integration and counter-cyclical fiscal policy, which are 
both high among priorities of the EAC policymakers.  
 
II.2 Macroeconomic Performance  
 
The EAC grew faster than the rest of the continent both before and during the GFC, the 
lack of natural resources notwithstanding (Table 2).6 In spite of the negative impact of the 
GFC, East Africa posted 5.8% real GDP growth in 2009 and has already recovered some 
of the lost growth momentum in 2010 and 2012. Rwanda, Tanzania and Uganda have led 
the regional economic expansion, alongside Ethiopia and Sudan. Kenya, which grew 
rapidly in 2006 and 2007, suffered a setback in 2008 due to the violence that broke out 
after the elections at the end of 2007. Among the EAC’s members, only Burundi’s 
growth has been low throughout the 2000s, reflecting in part the country’s fragility.  
 
Table 2. Real GDP growth in East Africa (EAC) and other Africa’s sub-regions 1/ 
  2002-06 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
 (annual, in percent) 
EAC 6.6 7.1 7.4 4.1 5.1 5.6
RoEA 2/ 2.9 7.3 3.2 4.1 4.7 4.3
West Africa 4.7 4.7 5.4 3.4 4.5 5.1
Northern Africa  4.9 4.5 4.1 2.7 4.6 3.4
Southern Africa 4.5 5.5 4.7 2.2 4.2 5.6
Central Africa 4.6 4.0 2.9 2.0 5.5 4.3
Source: Authors’ calculations based on the African Economic Outlook (AEO) 2012.  1/ Median values. 2/ 
Rest of East Africa other than the EAC countries.  
 
                                                 
5 On the positive side, countries eliminate the economic costs related to the exchange rate fluctuations. 
6 The discovery of oil and subsequent development of the resources has been changing Uganda’s position. 
Tanzania also benefitted from rising gold prices although the sector is not the main driver of growth.  
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Overall macroeconomic performance was mixed. While inflation was in single digits in 
2007, it jumped to double digits due to increased food prices in 2008. Despite the global 
financial crisis’ dampening of the inflationary pressures in 2009, the inflation accelerated 
in 2010 and 2011 due to droughts and rising food prices. On the positive side, external 
debt is sustainable and debt payments are low, in part due to debt relief initiatives from mid-
2000s. While the fiscal deficits remained under control despite the stimulus packages 
adopted in 2009 and 2010, the relatively sizeable trade and current account deficits 
continue to pose a challenge for macroeconomic convergence of the EAC. 
 
Meeting these convergence criteria has so far been elusive. An inspection of the 
performance of the EAC member countries’ performance since 2000, relative to the 
convergence criteria, reveals significant variations (Figure 1). Notwithstanding the high 
regional growth, only Tanzania and Uganda have managed average GDP growth of more 
than 7% over the last four years to 2010. There are down-side risks to growth in these 
two countries, especially when the growth has largely been driven by resource-based 
exports or investments as in the case of Uganda.    
 
Important threats for macroeconomic stability in the region persist. Inflation and 
exchange rates in particular are still volatile. In August 2011 the annual inflation was in 
double digits – way above the 5 percent target -- in Kenya, Uganda, and Tanzania, due to 
rising food prices. In 2009 and 2010 the budget deficits (after grants) of Kenya and 
Tanzania exceeded the 3 percent target when counter-cyclical fiscal policies were 
adopted against the impacts of the global financial crisis (Kasekende, et al., 2010). 
Ensuring adherence to macroeconomic targets in the absence of any agreed rules 
therefore poses serious challenges to the proposed EAMU.  
 
Figure 1. EAC Macroeconomic Performance Relative to Convergence Criteria 
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Source: AfDB Statistical database.  
Even though all EAC countries fall into the low income category, substantial differences 
exist in their levels of development. The different levels of development of the EAC 
countries and divergence of their economic outcomes have been one of the arguments 
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against speedy creation of the EAMU.7 On the one side of the spectrum is Kenya, which 
is the most developed and the largest EAC member. It is the regional trade hub, while its 
private enterprises lead the intra-regional investment. Kenyan banks also operate across 
the region, with subsidiaries in Rwanda, Tanzania and Uganda (AfDB, 2011).8  
 
Nevertheless, the region’s financial sector is not yet sufficiently integrated. Although 
foreign banks dominate in the EAC, their focus is largely on domestic markets. Despite 
the creation of a regional Securities Regulatory Authority and partial capital account 
liberalization and the encouragement of cross-listing; capital market cooperation and 
integration has been limited. For instance, the November 2006 agreement between the 
Uganda Stock Exchange and the Kenya Stock Exchange allowed cross-listing of blue-
chip companies yet cost considerations prevented most of the firms from doing so (World 
Bank, 2007).  Following an example of Nigerian banks that have entered the region, 
Kenyan banks have recently established operations in Rwanda, Tanzania and Uganda. 
This development needs to be supported by an appropriate regulatory framework, 
including through home country supervision and regulation.  
 
More broadly, one of the arguments against speedy creation of the EAMU has been the 
different levels of development of the EAC countries and their varied economic 
outcomes. For example, the Burundi’s average import growth exceeded that of exports by 
a factor of 3 since 2003, resulting in the current account deficit of 19.1 percent of GDP in 
2008 – far above the other EAC members. While inflation was in single digits until 2007, 
it jumped to almost 25 percent in 2008 due to the food crisis. The question arises if such 
divergent performance would reduce the country’s benefits from the EAMU. Conversely, 
and as the experience of the euro area suggests, unless Burundi strengthens its 
macroeconomic situation, its membership may destabilize the EAMU. 
 
II.3 Trade Flows, Structure and Barriers 
 
According to the OCA criteria, rising intra-regional trade is consistent with the objective 
of monetary integration, as a common currency would lead to substantial cuts in 
transaction costs (McKinnon, 1963). In that aspect, the EAC countries fare well, as trade 
among the EAC members has intensified prior to the GFC. 
 
Specifically, the share of imports from Europe and other advanced economies has been 
falling while the share of trade within the EAC is rising. About 20 percent of East 
African exports were within the EAC during 2000-07 (Table 3). The average growth in 
intra-EAC exports exceeded that of extra-EAC in Rwanda, Tanzania and Uganda (Figure 
2). Still, average import growth within the EAC has been lower than import growth from 
outside the region in Burundi, Kenya and Rwanda, reflecting the dominance of basic 
consumer products in intra-regional trade, with manufactures coming mostly from the 
                                                 
7 The euro introduction took much longer for countries of markedly greater structural similarity than 
exhibited by the EAC countries.   
8 Nevertheless barriers to the greater financial integration – one of the preconditions for successful 
monetary integration – remain high and include capital flows restrictions (Wang, 2010).  
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outside. Kenyan exports to the region accounted for almost 65 percent of the total intra-
regional exports. 
 
Figure 2. Intra-EAC and Extra-EAC (ROW) Trade Growth, 2005 - 08 (4-year averages) 
Source: Authors’ Calculations based on the IMF Direction of Trade Statistics Online Database. 
 
Another key characteristic of East Africa that bodes well for formal economic integration 
is the large share of informal trade in the region. For example, the share of the informal 
trade in total trade in Uganda has increased markedly during 2000s. In fact, in 2009 the 
informal exports to the EAC countries and other neighbors (Sudan, DRC) exceeded its 
total formal exports. The large informal trade volume suggests that formal trade can 
expand further. To facilitate this process, barriers to trade should be eliminated to reduce 
the informality and the related transactions cost. Increasing the stock and quality of 
regional infrastructure is also needed to harness this intraregional trade potential. 
 
Despite the relatively large volume of trade among the EAC countries, significant 
challenges to monetary integration remain, including the transaction costs for across-the 
border trade. Over the medium term regional integration strategies need to develop 
complementarity in higher value added products than basic agricultural commodities to 
raise the capacity of East African countries’ to trade.9 Incentives to formalize will be 
important as informal firms find it more difficult to innovate and adopt new technology. 
Modernizing immigration policies to facilitate the flow of labor and address persistent 
skill shortages will be key to fostering intraregional trade, which is likely to bring about 
greater structural similarities. Moreover, reducing volatility of exchange rates would help 
increase trade and finance flows (Newfarmer and Söderbom, 2012).   
 
                                                 
9 Additional impediments to monetary integration in Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda are substantial financial 
barriers such as restrictions on capital flows.  
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Table 3. Share of intra-regional and intra-Africa trade by RECs (million US$) 
2000 2003 2005 2007 2000-07
EAC total exports 3,053 4,133 5,984 7,788 4,951
    intra EAC exports 689 879 1,075 1,385 957
      % of total exp. 22.6 21.3 18 17.8 20
    exports to rest of 286 457 664 1,037 572
      % of total exp. 9.4 11.1 11.1 13.3 11.1
  total exports to Africa 32 32.3 29.1 31.1 31.1
AMU total exports 49,048 54,933 99,669 139,040 77,883
    intra UMA exports 1,094 1,338 1,886 3,076 1,698
      % of total exp. 2.2 2.4 1.9 2.2 2.3
    exports to rest of 80 14 216 1,770.00 460
      % of total exp. 0.2 0 0.2 1.3 0.4
  total exports to Africa 2.4 2.5 2.1 3.5 2.7
SADC total exports 47,772 55,998 89,058 133,525 74,735
    intra SADC exports 4,296 5,484 7,454 11,678 6,512
    % of total exp. 9 9.8 8.4 8.7 8.8
    exports to rest of 1,230 1,879 2,731 3,740 2,193
     % of total exp. 2.6 3.4 3.1 2.8 3
  total exports to Africa 11.6 13.1 11.4 11.5 11.8
WAEMU total exports 6,662 9,850 12,661 15,039 11,166
    intra WAEMU 741 1,076 1,390 1,917 2,063
    % of total exp. 11.1 10.9 11 12.7 11
    exports to rest of 947 1,194 1,879 2,731 1,658
      percent of total 14.2 12.1 14.8 18.2 14.8
  total exports to Africa 25.3 23 25.8 30.9 25.9
CEMAC total exports 8,361 11,552 22,944 29,898 16,683
    intra CEMAC 96 146 198 304 177
   % of total exp. 1.1 1.3 0.9 1 1.1
    exports to rest of 220 282 483 580 382.3
      percent of total 2.6 2.4 2.1 1.9 2.5
  total exports to Africa 3.8 3.7 3 3 3.6  
Source: ECA, AfDB and AUC (2010). Assessing Regional Integration in Africa IV: Enhancing Intra-
African Trade, Addis Ababa: ECA. 
 
To achieve greater intra-regional trade and structural similarity -- and hence shock 
synchronization -- barriers to trade within EAC need to be eliminated while common 
policies towards the outside of the EAC should be adopted.  The region’s trade agenda 
has thus a wider scope than reducing intra-regional tariff barriers. Its current primary 
focus is on removing structural – mostly non-trade -- barriers to competitiveness and 
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trade.10 Besides its traditional objectives (removing quotas and tariffs), trade policy of the 
EAC thus now strives to strengthen the members ‘soft’ and ‘hard’ infrastructure so as to 
enable them to leverage their relative comparative advantages. The focus on relative 
comparative advantages would also help diversify the EAC product mix and could 
enhance the scope for intra-regional trade along the value chains.11  
 
Figure 3. The Real GDP growth and inflation in the EAC, 1980 - 2011 
 
3a. The EAC: Inflation (%)   3b. The EAC: Real GDP Growth (%) 
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Source: AEO 2012 and IMF WEO database (as of April 2012).  
 
Sections below test the degree of shock synchronization among the EAC countries 
formally, adopting simple correlation and structural vector auto-regression analysis 
(SVAR) methods on the real GDP growth and inflation data during 1981 - 2009. 
Moreover, given the increased formal intra-regional trade and high informal trade within 
the EAC countries, the empirical analysis will also examine the endogeneity of the OCA 
hypothesis. This will be carried out by subdividing the period into two sub-periods: 
before and after 1990.  
 
III.1 Correlation of Economic Activity is low 
  
First, we examine the degree of synchronization of economic shocks between the EAC 
countries using correlations for output growth and inflation for all pairs of countries. Pair-
wise correlations of the real GDP growth and inflation during 1981 – 2009 are mostly 
positive, albeit low, and increased during 1990 - 2009 (Figure 4). This result informs the 
split in the data in estimations below, which also accounts for periods of high inflation in 
                                                 
10 For linkages between competitiveness, trade and FDI in Africa, please see Blanke et al. (2011).  
11 To promote intra-regional trade, the revised EAC Protocol aimed at gradual reduction in tariffs for goods 
classified under category B, i.e. agricultural products, building materials, plastics, wood and paper, textiles, 
iron and steel and other manufactures. No tariffs were to be charged on category A products. An annual 2 
percent reduction in tariffs was agreed with the objective of complete elimination of the tariffs by 2010.  
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the series for Tanzania and Uganda. The high levels of inflation are not observed after 
1990 (Figure 3b). Volatility in GDP growth and inflation also decreased since 1990. 
 
Figure 4a. Pair-wise correlations between the real GDP growth in the EAC countries 
 
 
Figure 4b. Pair-wise correlations between the inflation rates in the EAC countries 
 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on the AEO and IMF WEO database.  
 
III.2 Structural Similarity Indexes indicate growing similarity 
 
a. Structural Similarity Measured by Value Added 
 
The structural similarity of production between the EAC members and Kenya is 
measured in terms of Bray-Curtis index.12 Denoting ijx to be the share of sector i in the 
total value added of country j, and ikx  denoting the share of sector i in total value added 
                                                 
12 Kenya, the largest and most developed economy in the region, was chosen as the reference point for the 
degree of convergence. 
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of Kenya. The countries in this case being (i) the EAC members other than Kenya and (ii) 
Kenya, and N as total number of sector, the index is defined as: 
 
)(∑
∑
=
=
+
−
= N
i
ikij
N
i
ikij
ij
xx
xx
d
1
1      (1) 
 
The index takes values between [0,1]. The index is a measure of distance, and hence 
lower values indicate a greater structural similarity between sectoral contributions to total 
values added in (i) the EAC members other than Kenya and (ii) Kenya. According to this 
index, the EAC’s production structure – measured by six categories (agriculture, industry, 
construction, trade, other private sector services, social services) – has converged to that 
of Kenya over the past twenty years. Most of the convergence occurred during 1990s 
though, with stagnation afterwards. Moreover, in all countries except Uganda and Kenya, 
the share of agriculture is 30 percent or more of the output. The large share of similar low 
value production in countries’ GDP inhibits trade and regional integration.  
 
Figure 5. Bray-Curtis Similarity Index: Kenya and other EAC members, 1991 - 2010 
 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on data from the UN national account statistics.  
 
b. Structural Similarity Measured by Exports 
 
 Despite increasing intra-regional trade, the EAC countries exhibit export dissimilarities. 
Indices presented in Table 4 show no evidence of export similarities between Kenya and 
the other EAC members. Following Xu and Song (2002) the indices focus on the market 
domain, where the objective is to compare the similarity between Kenya’s exports and 
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those of the other EAC countries. The indices, where ikx  is the export of good k by 
country i, and jkx  are Kenya’s exports of good k, are obtained as follows: 
 
 
 
The index ranges between 0 and 100, where zero and 100 denote no similarity and perfect 
similarity, respectively. For both years, Burundi’s and Rwanda’s exports to the EAC are 
the least similar to those of Kenya while there is very limited similarity between the 
latter’s exports and those of Tanzania and Uganda (Table 4).  
 
Table 4 Export Similarity Indices between Kenya and those of the other EAC Members 
Year Burundi Rwanda Tanzania Uganda 
2009 1.4 2.4 14.0 19.6 
2010 0.7 2.7 25.1 19.2 
Source: Authors’ calculations.  
 
 
III.3 Structural VAR Approach 
 
This section applies a two-variable structural VAR (SVAR) framework to assess 
suitability of the EAC countries for monetary union. The economic shocks experienced 
by the EAC countries are decomposed into supply and demand shocks and their 
correlations examined. The section also examines whether the supply and demand shocks 
have become more synchronized over time.  
 
The SVAR framework was developed by Blanchard and Quah (1989) and utilized by 
Bayoumi and Eichengreen (1993) to analyze the suitability of European monetary 
integration. More recently, it was applied by Fidrmuc and Korhonen (2003) and Brixiova, 
et al, (2010), among others, to assess the degree of synchronization of countries of 
Central and Eastern Europe with the Eurozone. In the Asian context this approach was 
utilized for example, by Zhang et al. (2004), among others.  
 
III.2.1 The AD-AS Model 
 
The shock synchronization model is based on a two variable (output growth and 
inflation) aggregate demand-aggregate supply (AD-AS) macroeconomic framework. The 
AD-AS framework assumes that fluctuations in real output, ty , and the price level, tp , 
are due to supply and demand shocks. In this framework the long run aggregate supply 
curve is vertical at the full employment level of output, but the short run one is upwards 
sloping due to sticky wages.13 In the EAC context, it is worthwhile to note that as all 
members have removed most price controls, prices in the goods and services markets are 
                                                 
13 Real wages initially decline with price increases, leading to higher employment and output. With a lag 
(in the long run), real wages adjust to their initial value. 
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best characterized as flexible. However, wages are sticky due to the presence of 
minimum wages and the role of public sector wages as a reference point for private sector 
wage levels. Moreover, unemployment in the region remains high.14  
           
As discussed above, in this AD-AS framework, the responses of real output and the price 
level to positive demand and supply shocks can be summarized as follows (Table 5):15 
 
Table 5. Expected Dynamic Responses for the AD-AS Framework 
 Type of shock Short Run Long Run 
Positive AS shock  Positive Positive Output response to 
Positive AD shock Positive None 
Positive AS shock Negative Negative Price response to 
Positive AD shock Positive Positive 
 
III.2.2 Estimation Results 
 
Data 
 
We use annual and seasonally unadjusted data on real GDP and inflation from the five 
EAC countries for the period 1980 - 2009. The data was obtained from the African 
Development Bank online data platform. To avoid any spurious relationships the Ng-
Perron unit-root test was used to determine the process generating the data series. This 
test was used because experiences in the application of the Augmented-Dickey-Fuller 
(ADF) and Phillip-Perron (PP) unit root tests have shown that they are affected by finite 
sample power and size problems.16 Specific attention was given to the lag truncation 
criterion, with the optimal lag determined as one. The results of the stationarity and 
estimation tests are presented in Annex B. Overall, output growth and inflation series 
from the five countries were found to be stationary while inflation data for Tanzania and 
Uganda only became stationary after the first difference.  
 
Correlations of Demand and Supply Shocks 
 
Table 6 presents correlation coefficients of the supply and demand shocks (the SVAR 
error terms) between Kenya and the remaining four EAC countries. Only recently the 
EAC members agreed on convergence criteria and none of them has satisfied them to 
date, leaving Kenya as a natural anchor.  
 
 
 
 
                                                 
14 While the depiction of the short-run AS relationship as a reduced form mark-up price-setting equation of 
a disequilibrium labor market has been questioned, Rao (2007), Boyd (2010) and others have supported it. 
15 Identification of supply and demand shocks is detailed in Annex A. 
16 DeJong, et al (1992) has shown that the ADF and PP tests can result in rejecting the alternative 
hypothesis of stationarity. On the other hand, the ADF and PP tests are also known to suffer from severe 
size distortions leading to bias towards rejecting the null hypothesis of non-stationarity (Schwert, 1989). 
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Table 6a. Correlation of shocks between Kenya and the EAC-4 (1981 – 2009) 
Country Supply shock Demand shock 
Burundi 0.0940  0.2429 
Rwanda  0.0011 0.2779 
Tanzania  0.1207  0.2510 
Uganda  0.0113 -0.3034 
 
Table 6b. Correlation of shocks between Kenya and the EAC-4 (1990 – 2009) 
Country Supply shock Demand shock 
Burundi 0.0432 0.1714 
Rwanda -0.0122 0.2101 
Tanzania -0.1574 0.5142* 
Uganda -0.0677 -0.0302 
Source: Authors’ calculations. * Indicates statistical significance.  Note: Kenya is the reference country in 
the comparisons. 
 
Table 6a shows the limited degree of shock synchronization between the EAC-4 
(Burundi, Rwanda, Uganda, and Tanzania) and Kenya during 1981-2009. While most 
shocks are positively correlated, the correlation coefficients are low and none of them is 
statistically significant.  Moreover, the demand shock has an opposite effect in Uganda. 
The results are not surprising in light of the major disparities in macroeconomic 
performances of the EAC countries, especially before 2000. 
 
Impulse Response 
 
This section utilizes impulse response function to examine responses of the EAC 
countries to the supply and demand shocks in terms of size and the speed of the 
adjustment. The larger the size of the shock and the slower the adjustment, the more 
costly it would be for a country to maintain membership in monetary union.  
 
An examination of the impulse response functions (Figure 6) suggests that while demand 
shocks have no effect on the long-run output in Burundi, Rwanda and Uganda, 
adjustment to such shocks takes a minimum of six years. Such slow adjustment points to 
rigidities in the business environments and labor markets (greater wage stickiness, for 
example). Moreover, past demand shocks in Tanzania and Kenya seem to have a long-
lasting effect on output, suggesting that these were accompanied by supply shocks (i.e. 
increases in government spending accompanied by greater outlays on infrastructure, 
which could increase the countries’ potential outputs).  
 
On the other hand, and as predicted by the AD-AS framework, a positive income/output 
shocks appear to have long-run effects on inflation in all EAC countries, with the greatest 
impacts in Uganda and Tanzania. These two countries have exhibited higher than the 
average regional variability in inflation. In general as low – income countries with high 
income propensity to consume, the EAC members may experience self-reinforcing 
effects when income shocks occur. Specifically, a positive income shock may lead to 
higher demand response that is reflected in rising prices.  
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Figure 6: Accumulated Impulse Responses to Shocks 
 
6a. Burundi: Accumulated response of inflation  6b. Burundi: Accumulated response of GDP growth 
to supply shock (one SD in GDP growth)  to demand shock (one SD in inflation)  
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6c. Kenya: Accumulated response of inflation  6d. Kenya: Accumulated response of GDP growth 
to supply shock (one SD in GDP growth)  to demand shock (one SD in inflation)  
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6e. Rwanda: Accumulated response of inflation  6f. Rwanda: Accumulated response of GDP growth 
to supply shock (one SD in GDP growth)  to demand shock (one SD in inflation) 
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6g. Rwanda: Accumulated response of inflation  6h. Rwanda: Accumulated response of GDP growth 
to supply shock (one SD in GDP growth)  to demand shock (one SD in inflation)  
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6i. Uganda: Accumulated response of inflation  6j. Uganda: Accumulated response of GDP growth 
to supply shock (one SD in GDP growth)  to demand shock (one SD in inflation)  
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Source: Authors’ calculations. Note: time period (on the horizontal axis); vertical axis illustrates 
percentage changes; and continuous line indicates percentage changes (vertical axis) in the response 
variable to one Standard Deviation to shock.  
 
Variance Decomposition 
 
This section examines which of the underlying shocks – supply and demand – contributes 
most to the variance of output growth and inflation in each country. The information 
helps gauge the degree of convergence between countries’ transmission mechanisms.  
 
Variance decomposition of the structural VAR revealed that supply shocks (e.g., changes 
in commodity prices, weather) accounted for most of the real output variability in all 
countries and tended to last longer. On the other hand, demand shocks (e.g. demand 
management policies) had large effects on the variability of inflation in  all the EAC 
countries except Uganda. In Burundi prices responded more to output shocks than the rest 
of the regional countries. The immediate effect of the output shock was limited. The high 
levels of inflation Uganda until the mid-1990s tended to reinforce inflationary pressures 
in the short-run. Results are detailed in Table 7.  
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Table 7: Variance Decompositions – Full Sample 
GDP growth  
 Period 
Variance 
to  Supply 
Shock 
 
Variance 
to Demand 
Shock 
 
Variance 
to Supply 
Shock 
 Variance 
to Demand
Shock 
Variance
to Supply 
Shock 
Variance 
to Demand
Shock 
Variance 
to  Supply
Shock 
Variance 
to Demand 
Shock 
Variance 
to  Supply
Shock 
Variance 
to Demand
Shock 
 
 Burundi Kenya Rwanda Tanzania Uganda 
  
1  100.0  0.0  90.8  9.2  100.0  0.0  100.0  0.0  100.0  0.0 
 2  81.3  18.6  91.1  8.9  75.4  24.6  92.7  7.3  99.8  0.2 
 3  81.4  18.6  91.0  8.9  74.1  25.9  90.5  9.5  99.7  0.3 
 4  81.4  18.6  90.3  9.7  73.5  26.5  88.6  11.4  99.1  0.9 
 5  81.4  18.6  89.9  10.1  73.6  26.4  86.9  13.1  98.8  1.2 
 6  81.4  18.6  89.9  10.1  73.7  26.3  85.6  14.4  98.7  1.3 
 7  81.4  18.6  89.9  10.1  73.7  26.3  84.5  15.5  98.7  1.3 
 8  81.4  18.6  89.9  10.1  73.6  26.4  83.5  16.5  98.7  1.3 
 9  81.4  18.6  89.9  10.1  73.6  26.4  82.7  17.3  98.7  1.3 
 10  81.4  18.6  89.9  10.1  73.6  26.4  82.1  17.9  98.7  1.3 
    Inflation        
 Period 
 
Variance  
to Supply 
Shock 
Variance  
to Demand 
Shock 
 
Variance 
 to Supply 
Shock 
Variance 
to Demand 
Shock 
Variance 
to Supply 
Shock 
Variance 
to Demand 
Shock 
Variance 
 to Supply 
Shock 
  
Variance  
to Demand 
Shock 
 
Variance 
 to Supply 
Shock 
Variance 
to Demand 
Shock 
 
 1  7.7  92.3  1.3  98.7  1.0  99.0  0.1  99.9  9.0  91.0  
 2  29.8  70.2  5.7  94.3  18.7  81.3  3.7  96.3  44.2  55.8  
 3  34.2  65.8  5.7  94.3  21.5  78.5  8.4  91.6  68.5  31.5  
 4  34.7  65.3  6.7  93.3  22.4  77.6  10.7  89.3  75.3  24.7  
 5  35.1  64.9  7.4  92.6  22.5  77.5  12.2  87.8  76.8  23.2  
 6  35.4  64.6  7.6  92.4  22.5  77.5  13.2  86.8  76.9  23.1  
 7  35.5  64.5  7.6  92.4  22.5  77.5  13.8  86.2  77.0  23.0  
 8  35.7  64.3  7.6  92.4  22.5  77.5  14.3  85.7  77.2  22.8  
 9  35.6  64.4  7.6  92.4  22.5  77.5  14.7  85.3  77.4  22.6  
 10  35.6  64.4  7.6  92.4  22.5  77.5  15.0  84.9  77.5  22.5  
Note: Inf = Inflation; Q = Output 
III. Conclusions and Policy Recommendations  
 
Would the EAC countries need to give up macroeconomic stabilization capacity when 
establishing a common currency? We apply the OCA approach to gain some insights into 
this issue. The actual practice of monetary integration is underpinned by a diverse set of 
factors, including politics, increased credibility of monetary policy and more favorable 
expectations. Given this complexity, there is no (and cannot be) a “benchmark correlation 
coefficient” that would determine that the shock correlation of a country with potential 
monetary zone is sufficient for it to benefit from a common currency. Still, given the 
EAC’s low -- albeit increasing -- synchronization of shocks and business cycles as well 
as the rigidities in the business environment and underdeveloped infrastructure, costs of a 
premature adoption of common currency in the region are likely to exceed its benefits.  
 
The OCA approach is only one angle that countries consider when deciding whether or 
not to proceed with monetary integration, where the revealed shock asymmetry cautions 
against hasty implementation of a joint currency. The asymmetry underscores the 
importance of developing broader adjustment mechanisms other than monetary and 
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exchange rate policies. Labor and product market flexibility, and integration of financial 
markets are critical before establishing the EAMU. These mechanisms are crucial not 
only for the EAC’s monetary integration, but also the creation of a prosperous and 
economically well connected region that could compete in the global economy.  
 
Moreover, the recent experience from the euro zone indicates that besides fiscal union, 
banking union with joint supervision and regulation of systemically important financial 
institutions is an important element for preventing currency crises. Recent debates among 
the EAC policymakers indicate a preference for establishing a regional central bank that 
would control all the financial institutions in the region. These topics, so far unexplored 
for the EAC, could be addressed in future research.  
 
The lack of macroeconomic convergence strengthens the case against a hurried transition 
into a monetary union in the EAC. Given the divergent macroeconomic outcomes in the 
EAC countries, structural reforms, including closing infrastructure gaps, and harmonized 
macroeconomic policies that would raise synchronization of business cycles need to be in 
place before a move to monetary union. In that context, the role of appropriately prudent 
and coordinated fiscal policy cannot be emphasized enough. As the example of the 
Eurozone shows, a well-functioning fiscal transfer system (or union) may be needed for 
the longer-term viability of monetary union.17 Strengthening institutions charged with 
coordinating the regional integration agenda and increased information sharing within the 
region are needed. Basic rules for the regional bloc would help in this regard.  
 
Currie, et al (1989) established that policy coordination was problematic unless it was 
based on a rules-based framework. A rules-based framework, if properly implemented, 
engenders some discipline among member countries and reduces the risk of bad policies 
being pursued. The Eurozone debt crisis is a good example of weakly enforced rules and 
inadequate policy coordination. 
In light of the shock asymmetries in the EAC, policy coordination as currently pursued 
bodes well for achieving macroeconomic convergence. However, the linear approach to 
deepening regional integration is problematic. First, the economies are structurally 
different and at different stages of development. Second, intraregional trade within the 
region is still very low, which in itself could be a reflection of structural asymmetry. 
Strengthening institutions and improving the infrastructure that supports a competitive 
production system and trade is therefore central to deepening regional integration.  
Production asymmetries aside, the compensation framework is set to mitigate the likely 
varied impacts that countries will experience while implementing the EAC protocol. The 
resources for compensation could come under pressure if the transition to the EAMU is 
hurried. This compensation process – if well managed and timed - will allow member 
countries to transform structurally and respond to regional opportunities through the 
optimal utilization of their comparative advantages. 
                                                 
17 The EAC established a fund to compensate those countries that may face losses in implementing the 
EAC protocol. 
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Annex A. The AD-AS Framework and Identification of Supply and Demand Shocks 
Formally, the AD-AS framework is described as: 
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where ty  is (the log of) output in period t, and tt yE 1−  is (the log of) output expected in 
period t given information at t-1. Similarly, tp  is (the log of) price level in period t, while 
tt pE 1−  is (the log of) price level expected at t-1. The superscripts S and D represent 
supply and demand, and Stε  and Dtε denote the (serially uncorrelated) structural aggregate 
supply and structural aggregate demand shock, respectively.  
 
Equation (A1) is the AS curve, where output increases with unexpected increases in the 
positive supply shocks and price level. The AD in (A2) increases with its expected value 
and positive demand shocks. In (A1) – (A3) the long-run independence of nominal and 
real variables are independent in the long run, as the short run AS curve is upward 
sloping, but the long-run AS curve is vertical. System (A1) – (A3) can be written as:  
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The joint process of changes in real output and prices can be represented by an infinite 
moving average representation of a vector of two variables -- real output and prices) and 
a vector of supply and demand shocks:  
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εε , and iL  is the lag operator. The matrices iA represent the 
impulse response functions that transmit effects of the shocks to the variables (elements 
of tX ).  A finite version of (A5) can be estimated as VAR:  
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The matrices iB can be estimated from 0ABA ii =  and 0
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residuals yte , pte  consist of the underlying structural supply and demand shocks 
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Since these shocks are not observed, they need to be identified from the VAR residuals. 
The equations (A5) – (A7) describe the relationship between the estimated residuals (e) 
and the original shocks (ε ), which can be written as tot Ae ε= : 
 
⎥⎦
⎤⎢⎣
⎡
⎥⎦
⎤⎢⎣
⎡=⎥⎦
⎤⎢⎣
⎡
D
t
S
t
t
yt
aa
aa
e
e
ε
ε
π
.
2221
1211      (A8)    
            
where ija is the effect of shock j on variable i. Therefore we need to know the elements of 
0A to calculate the underlying supply and demand shocks. From (A4), the variance-
covariance matrix of the VAR residuals tyt ee π, is given by:  
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Since estimation of the VAR yields ),(),(),( tytptyt eeCoveVareVar π , the identification of 
the structural model requires four restrictions being imposed on the VAR. Standard 
assumptions are that 1,1 22 == DS σσ , that is variability of the demand and supply shocks 
is equal and normalized to unity, and that the shocks to aggregate demand and supply are 
uncorrelated with each other, .0),( =DSCov εε  In addition, the long-run neutrality 
restriction implies that cumulative effect of demand shocks on output must be zero, that 
is 0)(
1
12 =∑∞
=j
ja (demand shocks has no permanent impact on output). Alternatively, the 
last restriction can be written as .0)1()]1(1[ 12222212 =+− baba  Finally, model assumptions 
that positive demand shock will raise prices in both short and long run, while positive 
supply shock will lower them are below used for interpreting the results of the model. 
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Annex B Tests for Stationarity and Residual Normality 
 
Ng-Perron Stationarity Statistics 
Notes: ** Stationary after differencing once 
 
Example of the VAR Residual Normality Tests for Tanzania 
Component Skewness Chi-sq df Prob. 
1  1.940304  16.94151 1  0.0000 
2  0.645145  1.872955 1  0.1711 
Joint   18.81446 2  0.0001 
Component Kurtosis Chi-sq df Prob. 
1  8.575759  34.97522 1  0.0000 
2  3.098419  0.010897 1  0.9169 
Joint   34.98612 2  0.0000 
Component Jarque-Bera df Prob.  
1  51.91673 2  0.0000  
2  1.883852 2  0.3899  
Joint*  53.80058 4  0.0000  
*  Null Hypothesis that residuals are multivariate normal cannot be rejected using the joint 
Jarque-Bera test. 
 
Country Variable 1981 - 2009 1990 - 2009
Burundi GDP Growth -9.27826 -6.83788
 Inflation -12.7881 -8.72226
Kenya GDP Growth -11.1380 -8.29530
 Inflation -10.1670 -6.60626
Rwanda GDP Growth -13.8411 -9.31760
 Inflation -8.94909 -10.8064
Tanzania GDP Growth -10.9057 -8.79786
 Inflation -1.60702** -2.30190**
Uganda GDP Growth -9.08951 -644.906
 Inflation -4.65552** -6.29288
1% -13.8000
5% -8.10000*Ng-Perron (2001) Table 1  Asymptotic critical values 10% -5.70000
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 VAR Lag Order Selection 
Endogenous variables:  Lag FPE AIC SC HQ 
 0  1172.426  12.74250  12.84001  12.76954 
GDPB, INFB  1   857.4511*   12.42739*   12.71992*   12.50853*
  2  949.3369  12.52059  13.00814  12.65581 
  3  1180.660  12.71885  13.40142  12.90817 
  4  1493.049  12.91679  13.79438  13.16019 
       
 0  403.3516  11.67548  11.77299  11.70252 
GDPK, INFK  1   315.3601*   11.42715*   11.71968*   11.50828*
  2  400.6108  11.65781  12.14536  11.79304 
  3  502.4777  11.86458  12.54715  12.05389 
  4  440.8077  11.69682  12.57441  11.94023 
       
  0  30860.12  16.01289  16.11040  16.03993 
GDPR, INFR  1   6900.221*   14.51274*   14.80527*   14.59387*
  2  8017.876  14.65425  15.14180  14.78948 
  3  9004.647  14.75052  15.43309  14.93984 
  4  9819.409  14.80033  15.67792  15.04373 
       
  0  1224.112  12.78564  12.88315  12.81269 
GDPT, INFT  1   180.9008*   10.87138*   11.16391*   10.95251*
  2  248.4010  11.17987  11.66742  11.31509 
  3  305.0350  11.36545  12.04802  11.55477 
  4  409.8930  11.62411  12.50170  11.86751 
       
  0  32088.84  16.05193  16.14944  16.07898 
GDPU, INFU  1  6352.749  14.43007   14.72260*  14.51121 
  2  7307.924  14.56154  15.04909  14.69676 
  3  5839.882  14.31749  15.00006  14.50681 
  4   4557.396*   14.03272*  14.91031   14.27612*
 * indicates lag order selected by the criterion    
 LR: sequential modified LR test statistic (each test at 5% level)   
 FPE: Final prediction error     
 AIC: Akaike information criterion     
 SC: Schwarz information criterion     
 HQ: Hannan-Quinn information criterion.     
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